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Paradoxes of Social Impact Bonds 
Florentine Maier, Gian Paolo Barbetta, Franka Godina 
Abstract: Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) have alternatively been portrayed as a 
promising tool to improve the functioning of welfare systems, or as an instrument of 
neoliberalism that threatens to undermine them. Recently, a more nuanced 
understanding of the promises as well as pitfalls of SIBs has developed, as both 
practical experiences and published empirical evidence about implemented SIBs 
have increased in number. We aim to contribute to the development of such an 
understanding by means of a combination of qualitative and quantitative text 
analysis. In doing so, we analyse a comprehensive sample of 51 practitioner reports 
on SIBs. We identify two key paradoxes of SIBs. These paradoxes centre on 
statements that cannot both hold true for the very same SIB: (1) flexible but 
evidence-based services and (2) cost-saving risk transfer to private investors. We 
conclude by discussing how those paradoxes have been resolved in existing SIBs so 
far, which strategies of de-paradoxification may turn out paramount in future, and 
how positive aspects of SIBs can be preserved while defusing their more problematic 
ones. 
 
1 Introduction 
In many countries, the crises that began in 2007-2008 have contributed to an increase in 
welfare needs. At the same time, particularly in the EU, austerity policies have led to calls for 
restricting public welfare expenditures (Vis, van Kersbergen et al. 2011). This has created a 
tension, and incited practitioners and scholars to suggest changes in the welfare field: Private 
philanthropy should fill funding gaps; more services should be delivered by private providers; 
more resources should be devoted to the prevention of social problems rather than to their 
cure; and, finally, more attention should be paid to the actual impact of social policies in order 
to get the most out of public resources. Various approaches rooted in public choice theory – 
namely quasi-market theory and New Public Management – support such suggestions. They 
have contributed to the cultural climate that lead the birth of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs; For a 
comprehensive review of origins, context and conceptual foundations of SIBs, see Joy and 
Shields 2013). 
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Based on this socio-cultural back-ground, critical scholars have interpreted SIBs not as neutral 
instruments, but rather as part of a boundary shift that fundamentally alters the regime of 
welfare provision by rearranging responsibilities and rewards among governments, private 
investors, and social service providers (Sinclair, McHugh et al. 2014, McHugh, Sinclair et al. 
2013). These scholars caution that SIBs foster financialization, promote welfare retrenchment 
(Dowling 2017), and threaten to tear the fabric of social cohesion apart (Roy, McHugh et al. 
2017:271). 
Research anchored in financial economics, on the other hand, has been supportive of SIBs. A 
typical argument stemming from this line of research is that “[b]y redesigning social programs 
through market-based solutions, SIBs enhance transparency and evaluation of expenditures 
made by government” (Schinckus 2015:105); moreover, it is suggested that SIBs “encourage 
finance professionals to assume personal responsibility for their role in making markets more 
efficient” (Shiller 2013:21). Non-profit service providers too have been attracted to SIBs 
because they may provide stable funding as well as freedom to innovate and personalize 
services according to client needs (cf. Fraser, Tan et al. 2016:7). 
Given this wide latitude of views on SIBs, our aim is to contribute to a more nuanced 
understanding of their merits and limitations. Specifically, we explore in which ways claims 
concerning the merits of SIBs that are made in practitioner reports (produced by people and 
organizations involved in the creation and management of SIBs) are paradoxical and examine 
how these paradoxical claims are brought into coherence. To do this, we proceed as follows: 
In the next section, we explore the concept of SIBs in greater detail and review previous 
research on their potentials and perils. Then we describe how we used qualitative and 
quantitative methods of text analysis to analyse practitioner reports on SIBs. We present our 
findings, pinpointing two key paradoxes of SIBs: evidence-based flexibility and cost-effective 
risk transfer. We furthermore show how these paradoxes are resolved rhetorically in the texts. 
We conclude by discussing how they have been resolved in some existing SIBs, which de-
paradoxification strategies may turn out paramount in the future, and how positive aspects of 
SIBs can be preserved while defusing their more problematic ones. 
2 What is known about the potentials and perils of SIBs? 
SIBs – also called “pay for success” (PFS) bonds – are tools with many variations (cf. 
Clifford and Jung 2016, Arena, Bengo et al. 2016). Yet, they share certain commonalities: All 
SIBs involve a contract between a commissioner and a commissioning agency. The 
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commissioner is almost invariably a government. The commissioning agency may be an 
intermediary who prepares the deal, administers it, and subcontracts with service providers. 
Alternatively, the commissioning agency may also act as an investor, or may be a service 
provider acting as prime contractor and subcontracting with other service providers. 
Typically, service providers are private non-profit organizations or social businesses, but for-
profit service providers are also possible. In every SIB, there is at least one investor who is 
legally separate from the service provider and the commissioner. This investor may be profit-
oriented, philanthropic, or a blended value institution. It may take on all or part of the risk of 
non-performance, with or without guarantee of principal, with longer or shorter time to 
maturity. In all SIBs, payments from the commissioner to the investor are activated if service 
providers meet predefined social outcomes. An evaluator usually assesses the attainment of 
those outcomes. 
Research on the merits and limitations of SIBs is still at an early stage, largely consisting of 
conceptual writings and some mostly qualitative empirical studies of one or a few SIBs. A 
systematic review on SIBs has been conducted by Fraser et al. (2016). Covering grey and 
academic literature until March 2015, they identify three main narratives: a public sector 
narrative and a financial sector narrative, both of which come to an affirmative “win-win” 
portrayal of SIBs, and a cautionary narrative which highlights the risks of SIBs. Fraser et al. 
(2016) conclude that empirical evidence is too limited to conclusively confirm either of those 
narratives, although the cautionary narrative appears to be somewhat more plausible than the 
two affirmative ones. Since this literature review, the scientific debate has continued along 
roughly the same lines, with conceptual arguments brought forward in favour of SIBs (e.g. 
Clifford and Jung 2016) or in caution against SIBs (e.g. Roy, McHugh et al. 2017, Dowling 
2017, Rowe and Stephenson 2016). 
The main concerns of the cautionary narrative have been expounded in a case study of the 
London Homelessness SIB (Cooper, Graham et al., 2016). Drawing on Foucauldian theory, 
the authors show how this SIB undermines systemic understandings of the homelessness 
problem and replaces them with an understanding centred on the homeless person as a failed 
individual who becomes securitized into the potential future cash flow of investors. 
Now that an increasing number of SIBs have ended or reached an advanced stage of 
implementation, more evaluations that use transparent research methods are being published. 
Some of these investigate the merits and limitations of a specific SIB as a funding instrument 
(e.g. Disley, Giacomantonio et al. 2015, Roberts 2014). Some examine those aspects for 
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several SIBs in synopsis (e.g. KPMG 2014, Ronicle, Fox et al. 2016). Due to the bespoke 
characteristics of each SIB and each evaluation, it is not possible to draw definitive 
conclusions about the merits and limitations of SIBs in general from those evaluations. 
Notably, the aforementioned evaluation reports do not contain much information about 
transaction costs of SIBs, which, however, seem highly relevant. 
Despite these shortcomings, a recent study has compiled information about various SIBs and 
attempted to thereby arrive at conclusions about the feasibility of the SIB approach in general 
(Arena, Bengo et al. 2016). Results show that most existing SIBs deviate from the 
prototypical promises of SIBs in one or more of the following ways: Firstly, despite rhetoric 
to the contrary, SIBs often do not finance highly innovative and risky programmes. Secondly, 
despite the alleged outcome-orientation and flexibility of SIBs, some SIBs precisely define 
specific interventions. Thirdly, only few SIBs fully transfer risks to the private for-profit 
sector. In most SIBs, philanthropic foundations or governments provide some kind of 
guarantee for the invested principal. 
A recent conceptual paper by Giacomantonio (2017), who engages with the academic and 
grey literature on SIBs by building on a rational choice framework, comes to a similar 
conclusion: SIB-financed initiatives that are rational choices on the part of governments are 
unlikely to be attractive to investors interested in financial returns, and vice versa. 
Giacomantonio argues that the future of SIBs may be akin to forgivable loans from 
philanthropists to governments. 
Alltogether, the scientific debate about SIBs has become more firmly based on empirical data 
and more nuanced in tone. Key areas of concern have become clearer, notably SIBs’ 
politically contested effects on welfare systems, difficulties of keeping SIBs both outcome-
oriented and flexible at the same time, as well as difficulties involved in realizing cost-
effective risk transfer to the private sector. With the following analysis we aim to advance this 
debate by identifying the two key paradoxes intrinsic to the idea of SIBs: the paradox of 
evidence-based flexibility and the paradox of cost-effective risk transfer. 
3 Methods 
We identify paradoxes inherent to SIBs by looking at practitioner reports. We subject these 
texts to a qualitative and, to a lesser extent, also to a quantitative analysis on the basis of 
Luhmann’s (1991) and Czarniawska’s (2005) concepts of paradox and de-paradoxization. In 
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this section, we shall explain our sampling, the conceptual basis for our text analysis, and the 
procedure applied. 
3.1 Sampling 
Practitioner reports about SIBs were used as textual data. Reports, generally speaking, purport 
to provide factual information, not opinions. The language of reports is direct and formal. 
Reports are typically structured into sections; they are usually composed of an introduction, a 
body, and a conclusion. Depending on the subgenre, further sections such as references, 
appendices or a section on research methods may be added (Treadwell and Treadwell 
2004:205f.). For this text analysis, we focus on what may be referred to as practitioner 
reports: a particular subgenre of reports that exhibits the fundamental genre characteristics but 
does not include a section on research methods (Treadwell and Treadwell 2004:205). 
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Figure 1: Sampling procedure 
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Our sampling procedure is visualized in Figure 1. First, we searched all databases of ProQuest 
and EBSCO for sources that are classified as reports and that contain the term “social impact 
bond” or “social impact bonds”. We also searched the WEB OF SCIENCE databases for all 
sources featuring those keywords. After screening for duplicates, genre criteria of reports, and 
topical relevance, this search only produced two relevant results. Then we used 
scholar.google.com to search for sources of the file type pdf containing the term “social 
impact bond” or “social impact bonds”. We had noted that almost all of the documents 
exhibiting the genre characteristics of a report also contained the phrase “this report”, which is 
typically used in the introduction or acknowledgements section. We therefore included this 
phrase in the search string. Finally, based on lists of implemented SIBs contained in the 
reports retrieved so far, we conducted a snowballing search to find further reports that had 
been missed in the course of the two prior steps. This was done on google.com by searching 
for the term “report” in combination with the name of the SIB or terms closely connected to it 
(e.g. its location). 
All reports were then classified as to whether they contained a section on research methods or 
not. Reports with methods sections were marked as belonging to the subgenre of research 
reports and were considered in the literature review for this article. Practitioner reports were 
considered as textual data. Out of the 55 practitioner reports that were identified, 4 reports 
stood apart from the others due to their unequivocally negative assessment of SIB as well as 
their critical tone couched in anti-neoliberal discourse. It was not feasible to analyse those 
within the same framework of discursive categories as the remainder of the sample. The 
remaining 51 practitioner reports were imported into NVivo for qualitative text analysis. A 
compressed EndNote library containing full texts of all research and practitioner reports as 
well as tags to document the sampling procedure can be retrieved here: 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/ahuyehv5h6t0387/sample%20SIB%20reports%202017_05_02.en
lx?dl=0. 
3.2 Conceptual basis for data analysis 
Our first analytical task was to identify paradoxes. By paradoxes, we mean statements about 
benefits of SIBs that, according to generally accepted opinion (doxa), can be considered as 
incompatible (hence para-doxical). At first sight, the two statements in question cannot both 
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hold true for the very same SIB. Paradoxes are not innate qualities of texts, but appear as a 
result of subjecting narratives to logical analysis. It is the observational tool of analysis that 
deconstructs the narrative flow of the text, and thus reveals the paradoxes (Czarniawska 
2005:128, 141). Needless to say, the authors of the SIB reports do not see their statements as 
contradictory, and neither does the typical reader in an ordinary mode of reading. 
Our second analytical task was to identify the de-paradoxifying arguments. This task is 
crucial because, when we as researchers “catch” the authors of SIB reports contradicting 
themselves, this does not mean that we “unmask” them due to the superiority of our analysis 
over their narrative (Czarniawska 2005:141). It rather means that we are not done with our 
analysis yet. The next analytical task is to understand how it is possible that statements that 
would otherwise be considered as contradictory do not appear to be so (Czarniawska 
2005:141). We went about this task by focusing on de-paradoxifying arguments. With this 
term, we mean rhetorical moves through which statements that would otherwise appear 
paradoxical are brought into congruence. Once again, it needs to be stressed that those moves, 
according to Luhmann and Czarniawska, are not usually the result of deliberate scheming. On 
the contrary, a paradox can only be effectively mitigated in a narrative if the author does not 
examine it too closely. In other words, the author must not dwell on its conflicting sides too 
much. The texts that most effectively mitigate paradoxes of SIBs are those that only 
minimally touch upon contradictions, but nonetheless proceed to neutralise them in an almost 
somnambulistic manner, by bringing in additional common-sense assumptions or tacitly 
displacing the paradoxes in time and space. In prior research, generic strategies of de-
paradoxization have been delineated: focusing on either side of the paradox, choosing a 
middle ground (Fiol 2002), or suspending the paradox through temporisation, spatialization or 
relativization (Czarniawska 2005). We used those generic findings as a basis from which we 
inductively expanded our own analysis. The process of doing so shall be explained below. 
3.3 The procedure of data analysis 
The data was analysed by the first and third author in collaboration, with both authors taking 
turns to code the data and to crosscheck it for consistency. We applied a form of qualitative 
and quantitative text analysis customised for the research aim at hand, i.e. we analysed the 
texts in a hermeneutical-interpretative way, following systematic procedures informed by the 
theoretical concepts of paradoxes and de-paradoxification. 
The first step of our analysis was to mark all passages that refer to the merits of SIBs. In a 
second step, we coded these sections to group them into categories of merits. Four major 
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categories were thus identified: the evidence-based approach of SIBs, their conduciveness to 
flexible service provision, their potential to transfer risk to the private sector, and their 
potential to make social service provision more cost-effective. Thirdly, we examined the 
relationships between those categories in order to analyse how they contradict or corroborate 
each other according to common sense. This led to the identification of two key paradoxes, 
which will be characterised below. 
To identify de-paradoxifying arguments, we carefully re-read the texts and examined how 
statements that would otherwise appear paradoxical were reconciled in the texts. For this 
investigation, we drew upon the generic de-paradoxization strategies found in prior research, 
and inductively expanded on them to identify the typical argumentative structures that 
combined those statements into a consistent narrative. Finally, to enable quantitative 
orientation, we established how many reports contained any of those paradoxes and de-
paradoxifying arguments. 
4 Paradoxes and de-paradoxifying arguments 
Practitioner reports about SIBs, generally speaking, contain many passages about expected 
benefits. By looking at those passages in synopsis, we identify two key areas in which 
paradoxes occur: (1) evidence-based flexibility and (2) cost-saving transfer of risks. Table 1 
and 2 show how pervasive these paradoxes are in the genre. 
When looking at the reports from a diachronic perspective, it becomes apparent that 
arguments concerning SIBs have become more nuanced throughout the years. Early reports, 
for the most part, tacitly neutralize the paradoxes. Some of the more recent reports (e.g. 
Coletti 2016:4, Griffiths and Meinicke 2014:15) engage with the paradoxes in more open, 
reflexive ways. In the ensuing analysis, we will point out such variations whenever they 
appear to be salient. 
4.1 Evidence-based flexibility 
SIBs are promoted as tools that support flexible social services but, at the same time, 
contribute to the agenda of evidence-based policy: 
“The preventive intervention should be based on objective, evidence-based methods that not only helps 
[sic] the target population in the SIB, but could be scalable and replicable in other jurisdictions with a 
similar social condition. SIBs need to contain some flexibility, in that the service providers should have 
considerable freedom to define the strategy that seeks to achieve the desired outcome.” (Eames, 
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Terranova et al. 2014:24) 
It is stated that SIBs can, or even have to, be simultaneously flexible and evidence-based: 
 “The Social Impact Bond contract with government speciﬁes the desired outcome, but not the means of 
achieving it. This means that interventions can be tailored to local needs and can evolve over time as 
needs change. […] 
Preconditions for a successful Social Impact Bond: […] Evidence-based interventions: Investors must 
have conﬁdence that interventions to achieve the target outcome are well understood. It must be possible 
to estimate the impact of a certain level of investment on the target outcome.” (Bolton and Savell 
2010:47, 52) 
Clearly, this creates a tension, which practitioner reports have recently begun to address 
openly: 
“PFS contracts have an inherent tension between evidence and experimentation. They offer a way to 
experiment with evidence-based interventions in new settings or at a larger scale. Flexible 
implementation can create uncertainty for the evaluator and government, as it can be difficult to know 
why the intervention worked or failed, but this flexibility is also an advantage of PFS contracts compared 
to the typical government program.“ (Coletti 2016:4) 
This paradox of evidence-based yet flexible interventions can be found in 34 of the 51 
examined practitioner reports (see Table 1). To reconcile those contradictory ideas, the reports 
make use of three argumentative moves: (1) They use more flexible understandings of 
“evidence-based” interventions; (2) they reduce flexibility; or (3) they devolve the paradox 
onto the procurement intermediary or prime contractor. 
 Number of reports 
Reference to neither evidence-based interventions nor to flexibility  1 
Reference only to evidence-based interventions  14 
Reference only to flexibility  2 
Containing paradox of evidence-based flexibility  34 
 De-paradoxified by flexible understandings of ‚evidence 
based‘ 
28  
 De-paradoxified by reducing flexibility 11  
 De-paradoxified by devolution to intermediary or prime 
contractor 
10  
total  51 
Table 1: Paradox of evidence-based flexibility 
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4.1.1 Flexible understandings of “evidence-based” 
As in academic literature, in the practitioner reports the term “evidence-based” is used with 
various shades of meaning. The most widely used meaning is that funding is provided for a 
specific intervention for which a positive evidence-base already exists. This understanding, 
however, is particularly hard to reconcile with flexible service provision. Other 
understandings are more compatible with the notion of flexibility, for instance when complex 
professional know-how or evidence-building are considered as “evidence-based”, or when 
evidence-based interventions are merely seen as optional elements of SIBs. 
Complex interventions that are tailored to clients with widely diverging needs can be 
conceptualized as “evidence-based” if they are brought down to a framework for the overall 
workflow of the programme. Such personalized delivery models outline general dimensions, 
stages, or varieties of the programme, as well as a spectrum of measures that professionals 
apply at their discretion. The Energise SIB provides an example: 
“The provision began with an Individual Needs Assessment in order to help frontline staﬀ ascertain the 
correct level and intensity of support. […] Energise oﬀered three pathways with the core provision 
common to each: 
Pathway 1 – Core provision: designed to provide support, encouragement and practical skills for 
improving engagement and motivation. This pathway included 1-1 support, group sessions in school, 
mentor support and access to work experience. 
Pathway 2 – Short residential: designed for young people needing a short intensive period of residential 
support to overcome the barriers preventing them from engaging in school. […] 
Pathway 3 – Intensive: designed for the most at risk and challenging young people. An intensive 12 week 
support programme, it combined specialised provision, such as longer residential programmes and 
activity days […].” (Butler, Flory et al. 2016:8f.) 
Interestingly, it is state of the art in many disciplines that working with clients in such a 
sustained, individualized and holistic manner is thought to be beneficial. Such models are 
dependent on highly qualified professionals exercising their discretion, as the following 
example of a SIB that funds Multi-Systemic Therapy for troubled families illustrates: 
“You get to see the challenges that the family are facing ﬁrst-hand, and help them manage them as they 
arise. For example, I was recently in a therapy session when I observed the young person being 
disrespectful to her mother. Through role-play and direct intervention I was able to help the mother drop 
her anxiety and frustration and resolve the situation calmly.” (Social Finance 2014a:27) 
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To assess such a situation and decide that role-play would be appropriate is a professional 
competence that is based on scientific evidence; however, it needs extensive training and 
cannot be replicated easily. 
In some reports, the paradox is handled by using “evidence-based” in the sense of evidence-
building. Understanding the concept in this way, the SIB may build on existing evidence but, 
more importantly, promotes learning from ongoing performance measurement: 
“Real-time analysis and ﬂexibility to innovate and evolve allows Adviza and Social Finance to adapt the 
delivery model. Recognising that the current structure of pathway 2 residential programmes did not meet 
the needs of young people, the intervention was changed. The updated pathway 2 provision is longer and 
more intensive.” (Social Finance 2014b:35) 
The idea of an evidence-building, flexible SIB defers the paradox in time, because in order to 
generate strong evidence of what works, the nature of the intervention needs to be precisely 
documented and kept constant. 
Another solution that focuses on one side of the paradox is to argue that SIBs are primarily 
about paying for outcomes, with the evidence-base of intervention models being of secondary 
importance: 
“Social Finance recommends identifying the smallest number of Contractual Outcomes Metrics that 
create the right service provider incentives. For instance, an Impact Bond targeting a reduction in 
reoﬀending rates may have only a single Contractual Outcomes Metric, against which payments are 
made, to ensure that the focus of service providers and investors is clear. To build the evidence base 
around what works, the policy community may nevertheless want to evaluate what inﬂuenced reductions 
in reoﬀending within an Impact Bond (e.g. access to housing and beneﬁts, family reconnection, substance 
misuse counselling, etc.). To trigger contractual payments against such metrics, however, would presume 
prior knowledge about the detailed needs of the target population in terms of the intervention mix they 
require that is unlikely to be available. Such metrics would also risk distracting service providers from 
their core objective to reduce reoﬀending and instead place the focus on the way in which services are 
delivered negating much of the value of an outcomes-based approach.” (Social Finance 2016:10) 
4.1.2 Reducing flexibility 
The paradox can also be resolved by focusing on the side of evidence. In this case, SIBs are 
characterized as flexible with regard to the financing model but not the intervention itself: 
“PFS offers advantages over traditional government financing: risk transference, accountability, 
infrastructure building, and flexibility. […B]ecause payment is dependent upon results, there is more 
incentive to pick evidence-based programs and to empirically validate results. The focus on developing 
and using evidence-based social programs may also spur innovation in the social sector as programs 
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compete and are adopted based on the strength of their evidence and track records of success. […] 
Finally, the flexibility in PFS has advantages over traditional financing. The PFS transaction can include 
funding from numerous agencies whose resources might otherwise be separated or siloed because of the 
funding structure of government agencies.” (Roman, Walsh et al. 2014:14) 
This kind of de-paradoxization is concomitant with strict monitoring of the service delivery 
process: 
“[… T]he knowledge intermediary manages and provides oversight of service providers to ensure fidelity 
to the model devised for the program. Monitoring and supporting fidelity to the evidence-based program 
provides the strongest possible chance of positive results being achieved and of investors achieving a 
return.” (Roman, Walsh et al. 2014:13) 
4.1.3 Devolution to an intermediary or prime contractor 
A third de-paradoxifying move is to devolve the paradox to an intermediary or prime 
contractor. In this case, the service provider implements clearly defined evidence-based 
interventions, and the flexibility rests with the intermediary or prime contractor, who chooses 
among providers: 
“Such an intermediary can release a government procurer from the role of monitoring service providers 
intrusively. It could also be easier for a commercial intermediary to address the problems of a non-
performing provider than for a government agency which is inevitably operating in a more politicised and 
less commercial environment.” (Jeram and Wilkinson 2015:9) 
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4.2 Cost-effective risk transfer 
SIBs are promoted as instruments not only for evidence-based yet flexible service provision, 
but also for transferring the innovation risk of promising programmes or the implementation 
risk of proven programmes to private investors in a way that is cost-effective for the public 
purse. This idea is pervasive in practitioner reports (see Table 2). 
 
 Number of reports 
Reference to neither cost-effectiveness nor risk transfer  0 
Reference only to cost-effectiveness  3 
Reference only to risk transfer  1 
Containing paradox of cost-effectiveness and risk transfer  47 
 De-paradoxified by risk-adverse governments and service providers 38  
 De-paradoxified by philanthropic funding 47  
 De-paradoxified by cultural change effects of SIBs 42  
 De-paradoxified by transitory high transaction costs 32  
 De-paradoxified by additionality of SIB funding 39  
Total  51 
Table 2: Paradox of cost-effective transfer of innovation risk 
 
The following quote emblematically illustrates the paradox: 
 
“Under SIBs, the government contracts with the private sector and investors to provide social services, 
but payment is contingent on achieving pre-agreed social outcomes. The focus on outcomes rather than 
on social service inputs or outputs, and the contingent nature of payments, creates real performance 
incentives for service providers and investors, and shifts ﬁnancial risk to the private sector. Potentially, 
taxpayers pay for successful outcomes, but not otherwise.” (Jeram and Wilkinson 2015:7) 
The claim that this risk transfer will be cost-effective is paradoxical for two reasons. Firstly, 
SIBs have relatively high transaction costs for negotiating contracts and monitoring 
performances. Many practitioner reports discuss this: 
“SIBs are complex instruments. They involve multiple stakeholders coming from different sectors. Time, 
technical expertise and commitment to collaborate are indispensable in order to establish a SIB. 
SIBs have been costly instruments so far. They have entailed significant transaction costs that 
stakeholders should consider before embarking on them.” (Galitopoulou and Noya 2016:3) 
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Secondly, risk transfer usually comes at a cost. Basic investment logic dictates that risk 
transfer to private investors will reduce the variation of financial effects on the public purse or 
service providers, who would have otherwise have borne this risk. Total costs for 
governments (who like private investors can spread risk across many projects) will only be 
reduced, however, if they are able to strike preferential deals. This is only addressed in 
relatively few practitioner reports, such as the following: 
“In a social impact bond scenario, performance risk is borne mostly by the bond-issuing organization, 
rather than by the service provider. Because the bond issuer spreads the risk across its bond holders, it 
will be substantially more risk-tolerant than would be a non-proﬁt service provider in a direct 
performance contract. Nonetheless, investors will require compensation for taking on risk.” (Liebman 
2011:16) 
The by far more common claim is that risk transfer will reduce the net burden on government 
budgets: 
“Real risk transfer: If a scheme fails to demonstrate results the government will not pay out. A legitimate 
criticism of PPP/PFI has been that if they went wrong, the government landed up absorbing a large 
proportion of the losses. SIBs involve genuine risk transfer, which has both financial and political 
advantages.” (Mulgan, Reeder et al. 2011:15f.) 
A frequent phrasing is that governments pay “only for successful results” (Roman, Walsh et 
al. 2014:3), with no mentioning of the cost of de-risking. 
Some reports address this paradox; however, they do not portray it as a serious flaw of the 
SIB approach but rather as a challenge that should be overcome: 
“Despite the significant potential benefits of SIBs, there are also challenges that need to be worked 
through. A common response from Treasuries is that SIBs are an unnecessarily complex way of financing 
better social programmes. Since government’s costs of capital are significantly cheaper than markets, they 
should be providing finance. If there really are better approaches to cutting recidivism or unemployment, 
these should be directly funded by governments, rather than indirectly via SIBs.” (Mulgan, Reeder et al. 
2011:17) 
Some more recent reports, in particular when discussing implementation risks of proven 
programmes, conclude that SIBs may not be cost-effective for this purpose: 
“Is there some level of uncertainty about the effectiveness of the programme? (for example never 
implemented in the UK before, or not rolled out to this scale before)  No  If there is no risk in 
relation to the outcome of the programme, then the commissioner does not run the risk of wasting money 
by commissioning an ineffective programme  It is cheaper for the commissioner to fund the 
programme.” (Griffiths and Meinicke 2014:15) 
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If SIBs are to be maintained as cost-effective instruments for transferring risk, this paradox 
needs to be resolved. We identified five ways in which this is done rhetorically: (1) by 
construing governments or service providers as risk-averse, (2) by introducing philanthropic 
funding, (3) by pointing out additional positive cultural change effects of SIBs, (4) by 
maintaining that the relatively high transaction costs of SIBs are transitory, and (5) by arguing 
that SIBs increase the overall amount of funding going to good causes. 
4.2.1 Risk-averse governments and service providers 
In this de-paradoxifying argument, governments are portrayed as inherently unwilling or 
unable to take risks: 
“Government agencies, which might otherwise continue to fund the same old approaches they have 
funded in the past, would have an incentive to invest in promising new strategies, including preventive 
services. That’s because the risk of wasting taxpayer dollars if the new approaches fail is transferred to 
the private sector.” (Liebman 2011:3) 
Governments are thus construed as so risk-averse that even SIBs that involve paying a risk 
premium stand apart as one of the few ways in which they could take on any risk at all. 
In reports concerning SIBs in the UK, we additionally find the de-paradoxifying argument 
that, after years of the government shifting risk to service providers, SIBs are a way to relieve 
service providers of excessive risk by shifting it to more suitable private investors: 
“[A SIB] shifts much of the responsibility of raising upfront capital away from the service provider. Most 
service providers are relieved to no longer bear this burden. Rather, investors bear this risk.” (Dear, 
Helbitz et al. 2016:21) 
4.2.2 Philanthropic funding 
Another de-paradoxifying strategy is to involve investors who subsidize transaction costs or 
take on risk at below-market rates. These investors voluntarily forsake market-rate financial 
returns because they are also, or exclusively, interested in social return: 
“The advantage of philanthropic funding for SIBs is that it leaves open considerable scope for experiment 
and innovation, rather than relying on proven models of delivery. It can also accept high levels of risk – 
much higher than commercial funding.” (Mulgan, Reeder et al. 2011:8) 
Indeed, all reports that contain the paradox of risk-effective risk transfer bring up 
philanthropic funding as a possibility, and most reports argue that some kind of philanthropic 
funding will be indispensable. 
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4.2.3 Cultural change effects of SIBs 
A further way to resolve the paradox is to argue that SIBs promote positive cultural change of 
such magnitude that they are worth the relatively high costs. SIBs are said to provide an added 
value by promoting cultural change towards evidence-based policy, outcome-orientation, 
accountability, and prevention. Moreover, they are said to promote collaboration between 
service providers and across sectors, as well as correcting misaligned incentives: 
"SIBs are an expensive way to finance the scaling up of preventive programs. A SIB's 'premium' is 
justified if conventional options aren't working, or if the SIB helps government, philanthropy, and other 
social sector actors align their priorities and play their roles more effectively and efficiently” (Department 
of Budget and Finance 2013:10) 
These effects, it is argued, may lead to indirect public savings that justify the additional costs 
of SIBs in comparison to other ways of funding: 
“After the SIB term is complete, the government potentially has two options to extend the program. 
Theoretically, it could fund the program directly, or it could execute another SIB to fund the program for 
ﬁve to ten more years. Given the considerable value added by the intermediary and the market discipline 
that investors contribute, SIBs would be an eﬀective way to recapitalize successful programs.” (Social 
Finance 2012:13) 
4.2.4 Transitory high transaction costs 
Another de-paradoxifying argument is that high transaction costs are, to a large extent, a 
transitional problem, and that, as SIBs become more common, transaction costs will decrease: 
“We are already seeing signs of standardization in the ﬁeld, with programs being replicated and adapted 
to multiple geographies. This is important: it will accelerate the development of existing Social Impact 
Bond models, reduce the costs for government and allow for new social issues to come to the fore. 
Funders will gather data and be able to value speciﬁc outcomes with more conﬁdence […].” (Dear, 
Helbitz et al. 2016:8) 
A major part of transaction costs comes from performance measurement. Here it is argued 
that the SIB approach will soon enable less costly measurement methods, while, at the same 
time, actors are incentivised to devise them: 
“[… T]he development of effective measures of social impact is notoriously complex. Use of Social 
Impact Bonds could potentially speed up this process by increasing the incentive for social service 
providers to evidence the effectiveness of their interventions. Better evidence would improve their 
chances of becoming a service provider funded by Social Impact Bond investment.” (Bolton and Savell 
2010:22) 
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This line of argumentation leads to the conclusion that in cases where transaction costs for 
SIBs are too high, the solution would be to implement more – not fewer – SIBs. 
4.2.5 Additionality of SIB funding 
Finally, SIBs are framed as cost-effective because they are said to raise additional funds for 
the public good: 
“By attracting non-public funding, SIBs enable the public sector to raise additional funds for the 
provision of Early Intervention programmes.” (Griffiths and Meinicke 2014:13) 
The possibility that philanthropic funders may switch from non-refundable grants to SIBs is 
depicted as an overall increase of money going to the good cause: 
“Unlike public-sector or grant funding, impact investments produce ﬁnancial returns that can be 
reinvested in the social sector. In this way, capital can be recycled and returns can be used again to 
continue widening impact.” (Social Finance 2012:7) 
Only a few reports voice concerns that there may be a problem with this idea from the risk-
bearing investor’s point of view: 
“A key challenge for SIBs will be ensuring that SIBs do not displace existing spending and interventions 
by incentivising existing funders or providers to cut spending or provision.” (Mulgan, Reeder et al. 
2011:19) 
Likewise, only a few reports point out that this might be a problem with regard to government 
budgets: 
“SIBs are not a source of new, additional funding. SIBs do not raise new money for social programs since 
government ends up paying for the services when performance outcomes are met. As such, appropriating 
funding for a SIB in reality displaces funding for other programs. Theoretically, the remedial cost savings 
should be used to pay for the SIB and intervention costs, but most initiatives will not work out that 
neatly.” (Department of Budget and Finance 2013:8) 
5 Discussion 
Our findings confirm Giacomantonio’s (2017) analysis, which highlights the paradox of cost-
efficient risk transfer. To this we add that there is another key paradox intrinsic to the idea of 
SIBs: the paradox of evidence-based flexibility. The depiction of SIBs in practitioner reports 
is imbued with those two paradoxes. Whether and how they will be resolved when 
implementing really existing SIBs will be decisive for the future of this funding instrument, 
because those paradoxes constitute an important part of the charm of the SIB idea: They 
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enable several good things to happen at once that would otherwise be incompatible. They 
have also helped the SIB concept to gain popularity with various audiences, because the 
concept can be bended in one or the other direction, depending on the preferences of the 
audience and the situation at hand. In this sense, the concept of SIBs is not only paradoxical 
but also “chameleonic” (Smith 2013:191f.): It connects to several firmly institutionalized 
notions about what programmes or policies should be like (i.e., evidence-based, flexible, cost-
effective, safe) and combines them in a new, potentially transformative, but also vague and 
transformable way. To rhetorically achieve this, practitioner reports employ numerous de-
paradoxifying moves. Some reports suspend the paradoxes in time (by, for example, 
understanding “evidence-based” as evidence-building) or in institutional location (by, for 
example, devolving the balancing of flexibility and evidence to an intermediary). Some 
reports downplay elements that make SIBs attractive (by, for example, abandoning flexibility, 
or confining the appeal of SIBs to philanthropic investors). Some rely on a view of 
governments as risk-averse, or on potential fundraising effects, decreasing transaction costs or 
positive cultural change effects. 
The paradoxes and de-paradoxifying arguments that we have analysed are located in the 
discursive realm of writing about SIBs. To deepen our understanding of SIBs it would be 
important to further examine how existing SIBs resolve those paradoxes in practice. From 
what can be gleaned from published evaluations, every existing SIB is positioned somewhere 
with regards to those paradoxes, and more or less successfully resolves them in a particular 
way. To date, there are only a few evaluation reports based on transparent research methods 
that contain enough information to assess de-paradoxification strategies for particular SIBs 
with reasonable confidence by answering the followings questions: How flexible and how 
rigorously evaluated is the provided service? How risky is the intervention, and how is risk 
transferred? How cost-effective has the SIB been with regards to prevented spending, 
comparative costs of service provision, transaction costs, and risk premiums? On the basis of 
those few evaluations, we tentatively sketch out two examples of how the paradoxes of SIBs 
may – or may not – be resolved in practice: 
The world’s first SIB, which financed the ONE Service at Peterborough prison in the UK 
from 2010-2014, enabled flexible service provision, with a relatively weak grounding in prior 
evidence and a similarly weak focus on evidence-building. No theory of change was 
articulated, and the intervention was modified in the course of the SIB (Disley, 
Giacomantonio et al. 2015:23). This corresponds to the de-paradoxifying move of flexible 
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understandings of the term “evidence-based”, specifically the move of prioritizing outcome 
orientation. The Peterborough SIB was intended as a means of transferring the innovation risk 
of a promising intervention rather than the implementation risk of a proven intervention. 
Evaluations do not provide much information about the cost-effectiveness of this effort, but it 
is stated that “[s]takeholders did not report any major costs or disadvantages from the 
operation of the pilot in the area.” Governments and service providers are described to have 
been risk-averse (e.g. Disley, Giacomantonio et al. 2015:60). Charitable investors who took 
over risks at below-market rates were involved. Transaction costs were high (with the 
intermediary alone investing approximately 2.5 person-years of its resources and 300 hours of 
legal advice), but actors, to a large extent, engaged on a pro bono basis because they expected 
to bring down transaction costs in the long run (Disley, Rubin et al. 2011:15). Moreover, 
stakeholders report a number of positive cultural changes (e.g., better co-operation) that 
occurred in the course of the project. After the early termination of the pilot, similar 
rehabilitation services were rolled out with government funding across the UK, which 
constitutes an increase in resources going to this cause. Altogether, it seems that in the 
Peterborough case, the paradoxes inherent in the SIB idea were resolved in a way that the 
involved stakeholders widely perceived as consistent.  
The Essex SIB is a contrasting example. This SIB funds Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST) for 
young people at the risk of entering care, as well as for their families. It has been operational 
since 2013. MST is a clearly defined and licenced evidence-based intervention. In the Essex 
SIB, adherence to the MST model is monitored by the licensor. The SIB funding is reported 
to have enabled more flexibility by means of a special budget for supporting the outcomes of 
MST (e.g. to purchase a camping kit for a family to go on holiday), but the licensor’s close 
monitoring of model fidelity left little scope for therapists to adapt the delivery of MST a such 
(Roberts 2014:22). Evaluations suggest that not all stakeholders were satisfied with this 
solution to the paradox of evidence-based flexibility. In terms of risk-transfer, this SIB is 
mostly about transferring the implementation risk of a proven intervention. Whether this risk 
transfer was effective in economic terms remains unclear. Evaluations (Roberts 2014, Sin 
2016) provide no indication that the involved government agency or the service provider were 
highly risk-averse. Indeed, it would have been hard to introduce risk-aversion as a de-
paradoxifying argument in this case, because MST is supported by strong evidence that 
“minimises the risk of failing to achieve the agreed outcomes” (Roberts 2014:28). The price 
of the risk transfer was probably below market levels, because philanthropic funders were 
involved. The transaction costs of the SIB have been higher than expected (Sin 2016:23), and 
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all stakeholders have also contributed efforts for which they were not financially compensated 
(Roberts 2014:7). Some of those costs would not arise if the actors were to engage in a similar 
SIB again. Some of those costs were perceived by all actors to add value, either directly (for 
example by funding new posts) or through indirect cultural change effects (for example by 
encouraging greater efforts to ensure effective referrals). Some costs, however, were not 
widely perceived to add value. For example, the SIB required more data analysis than other 
payment by results contracts. Since the government agency and service provider already had 
relatively strong performance management in place, the SIB was perceived to add little value 
in this regard (Sin 2016:22 and 26). There is no evidence that the Essex SIB led to an increase 
in funding going to services for young people at the edge of care. To the contrary, the latest 
evaluation states that actors are nervous about recent or imminent funding cuts for such 
services (Sin 2016:14). The SIB may, however, have mobilized additional non-monetary 
resources provided by social investors in the form of advice and expertise (Roberts 2014:7). 
Altogether, the Essex SIB seems to be a case where the paradoxes of evidence-based 
flexibility and cost-effective risk-transfer have not been resolved in a way that all stakeholders 
perceive as convincing. 
We suspect that not all de-paradoxification strategies are equally effective in practice. For 
example, in order to resolve the paradox of evidence-based flexibility, devolution to 
intermediaries may not result in sustainable solutions, because it is not evident why the 
balancing act between flexibility and evidence-based service provision should be any easier 
for them. Reducing flexibility may undermine one of the main strengths of the SIB idea. 
Focusing on flexibility only may not be legal or desirable in cases in which the government 
has fiduciary duties to maintain certain standards of practice. It will therefore be essential to 
investigate how various kinds of compromises between flexibility and evidence-based policy 
work out in practice. Likewise, for the resolution of the paradox of cost-effective risk transfer, 
some de-paradoxification strategies may be more effective than others. It seems likely that 
SIBs are only cost-effective if they rely on philanthropic investors (Giacomantonio 2017), and 
that transaction costs will have to decrease substantially in the near future. De-
paradoxification by adverting to the alleged risk-aversion of governments may not hold up 
well to actual behaviours of many governments (see, for example, Mazzucato 2011). De-
paradoxification by claiming that SIBs will increase the total amount of funds going to good 
causes will need to be supported by actual funding practice. This may not happen if SIBs are 
accompanied by a squeeze on welfare, if the main sources of SIB funding are foundations that 
reallocate funds previously used for grants, and if the continuation of successful interventions 
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is not secured after the end of the respective SIB. De-paradoxification by reference to positive 
cultural change effects may be too ephemeral to support the SIB instrument in the long run, 
especially if problematic cultural change effects of SIBs also come to the fore. We would 
therefore welcome more empirical studies of larger numbers of SIBs that scrutinize the 
paradox of cost-effective risk transfer more thoroughly. To do this, it will be essential to 
generate more information about costs of SIBs. So far, information about transaction costs is 
patchy, at best. It should become good practice for evaluations to make this aspect more 
transparent. Moreover, to assess cost-effectiveness from a comprehensive perspective, issues 
like employment conditions and fair wages for service providers should be included in 
evaluations (cf. Joy and Shields 2013:49). 
Even if SIBs do not become widely established funding instruments, some of the elements of 
the SIB approach could be useful for improving welfare provision and could thus be 
incorporated into simpler institutional arrangements. For instance, more flexibility and 
professional discretion could be given to service providers through a variety of funding 
models, such as block contracts or contracting on the basis of outcomes. The idea of evidence-
based policy is attractive, but as apparent from the paradox of evidence-based flexibility, the 
path from generating evidence to making policies is not as linear and technically rational as 
proponents of SIBs have often implied. It may be the particular kind of collaboration between 
sectors pioneered in SIBs – rather than the idea of evidence-based policy in a rationalist sense 
– that has greater potential for improving social policies. Such collaboration between 
governments, non-profit service providers, and philanthropic foundations should be 
encouraged in order to improve knowledge flows about both promising as well as proven 
social innovations. 
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 Number of reports 
Reference to neither evidence-based interventions nor to flexibility  1 
Reference only to evidence-based interventions  14 
Reference only to flexibility  2 
Containing paradox of evidence-based flexibility  34 
 De-paradoxified by flexible understandings of ‚evidence 
based‘ 
28  
 De-paradoxified by reducing flexibility 11  
 De-paradoxified by devolution to intermediary or prime 
contractor 
10  
total  51 
Table 3: Paradox of evidence-based flexibility 
 
 
  
28 
 Number of reports 
Reference to neither cost-effectiveness nor risk transfer  0 
Reference only to cost-effectiveness  3 
Reference only to risk transfer  1 
Containing paradox of cost-effectiveness and risk transfer  47 
 De-paradoxified by risk-adverse governments and service providers 38  
 De-paradoxified by philanthropic funding 47  
 De-paradoxified by cultural change effects of SIBs 42  
 De-paradoxified by transitory high transaction costs 32  
 De-paradoxified by additionality of SIB funding 39  
Total  51 
Table 4: Paradox of cost-effective transfer of innovation risk 
 
 
